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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court erred by failing to quiet 
title in one of the two acknowledged deed lines. 
2. Whether the trial court erred by failing to resolve the 
disputed deed lines by reference to priority of title. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in finding boundary by 
acquiescence where the fence had been moved, where the period of 
time was insufficient and where the parties were never in 
acquiescence as to whether the fence line represented the 
boundary line. 
4. Whether the trial court erred in not allowing a 
conversation with a prior landowner admissible as an exception 
to hearsay. 
5. Whether the trial court erred by failing to recognize 
priority of title in the Judd deed. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLAIR W. and GLADYS 
JUDD FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
BERNELL L. HUTCHINGS, 
MRS. BERNELL HUTCHINGS, 
RONALD J. SHERMAN and 
MRS. RONALD J. SHERMAN, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action involved a boundary dispute in a rural area of 
Springville, Utah. The plaintiffs, the Judd Family Partnership 
(hereinafter "Judds"), filed a Complaint against the Hutchings 
and Shermans (hereinafter "Hutchings") seeking to quiet title, to 
relocate the fence line and to obtain damages. (R. 1-3). The 
Hutchings counterclaimed for basically the same thing; however, 
no affirmative defenses, such as estoppel, were set forth in the 
Hutchings1 Answer and Counterclaim. (R. 12-15). At trial, on 
September 5, 1985, the Judds sought to quiet title on the deed 
line set forth by the description on their deed, while the 
Hutchings sought to quiet title on the existing fence line. 
Case No. 860100 
Category No. 13b 
For clarity, counsel filed with the trial court a Stipulation 
as to the issues and attached a copy of the pertinent survey. 
(R. 43-46). Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is said Stipulation 
and survey copy. The Judd property is located to the south and 
the Hutchings to the north. The description on the Judd deed 
places the boundary at one point, the description on the Hutchings 
deed places the boundary at another point, and the fence line is 
at yet another place—see Addendum. 
The Stipulation states that a survey was performed by a 
Donald C. Cole, based upon both the Hutchings1 and Judds' deeds 
and that the only boundary in dispute is the southern Hutchings 
boundary and the Judd northern boundary, and that further, the 
only issues before the trial court were the location of the 
proper boundary, the payment of the expense for relocating the 
fence should that prove necessary, and the possibility of damages 
awarded to the Judds by reason of the disputed boundary. (R. 43-
46, 128-129). 
Undisputed testimony at trial revealed that the Judd property 
and description originated from a patent in 1833 and that the 
Sherman (predecessors of the Hutchings) property and overlapping 
description originated from a patent in 1884. (R. 136-7). The 
overlap in descriptions existed from that time forward. (R. 
137) . 
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Three witnesses for the Judds testified that since 1953 the 
existing fence had been relocated at least three different times, 
in 1958, 1977 and 1978, and that it had at various times been 
constructed of different materials, iron posts with barbed wire 
and cedar posts with pine, and that it had at one time abutted the 
barn and at other times run 4-6 feet from the barn. (R. 154-56, 
160, 170-72, 193-94, 197). 
Taxes have always been paid by the Judds to the most northern 
boundary line set forth in the Judd deed. (R. 156) . The Judds 
were informed long ago by Mr. Liechty, an owner prior to the 
Hutchings and Shermans, that the fence line was not correct. (R. 
158). After having a survey done by Mr. Cole, Mr. Hutchings 
requested that Judds sign a quit claim deed giving Hutchings the 
property to the fence line claiming that there was a mere four 
feet difference, whereupon Judds consulted Mr. Cole and the 
survey and found there to be a 56-58 feet difference. (R. 173). 
The trial court held for the defendants, Hutchings, and 
ruled on the basis of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, 
thus placing the boundary on the fence line. (R. 86-89). 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
were signed on January 23, 1986 (R. 102-109) and the Judds filed 
their Notice of Appeal on February 21, 1986. (R. 114). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The law in Utah regarding boundary disputes is set forth in 
Halladav v. Cluff. 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). There, the Court 
stated its desire to enhance- reliance upon property dimensions 
set forth in county records. Because of the weight given to 
record title, the availability of survey information in platted 
areas, and advances in survey technology, greater reliance upon 
record title information and lesser reliance upon boundary by 
acquiescence is mandated. Furthermore, this Court relegated the 
status of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence to an exception 
to the rule, that exception being that "only when it is not 
reasonable to expect landowners to ascertain thes true location of 
the boundary by [record title information] should landowners be 
allowed to claim boundary by acquiescence." 685 P.2d at 505. 
In the instant case, a survey was performed, upon which both 
parties stipulate reliance. The only issue properly before the 
trial court was which of the two deed lines was correct. Boundary 
by acquiescence should not have been considered. The deed 
descriptions overlap and the error is traceable back to the 
original patents of 1833 and 1884. The Judd property was first 
deeded out and outlined in. 1883, prior to the Hutchings property. 
That fact is not disputed. The trial court should not have even 
reached the question of boundary by acquiescence; however, once 
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addressed, the elements of boundary by acquiescence were not met. 
The fence line upon which Hutchings claimed boundary by 
acquiescence has been moved several times over the years, and as 
recently as 1978. Clearly, this does not meet the 20 years 
required for boundary by acquiescence. Further, the Judds were 
aware that the fence line did not represent the boundary line and, 
therefore, there was never a mutual acquiescence. 
Clearly, the mere fact of a fence line does not establish 
boundary by acquiescence, especially where there exists a reliable 
survey and reliable evidence as to priority of title. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ONLY ISSUE PROPERLY BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS WHICH OF TWO DEED LINES WAS CORRECT 
AND, THEREFORE, BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE SHOULD 
NEVER HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED. 
This Court has set forth the law regarding boundary disputes 
in the cases of Halladav v. Cluff. 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984), 
Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984), and Parsons v. 
Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984). 
In the leading case, Halladay v. Cluff, Justice Oaks, 
writing for the majority, was careful to clarify and distinguish 
preceding cases which had created "considerable confusion" 
regarding the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
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First, this Court stated that ffthe law clearly gives prece-
dent to the record title with boundary by acquiescence being an 
exception.If 
Second, it was clearly set forth in Halladay that there must 
be a showing of uncertainty or dispute as to the boundary line. 
Third, "dispute" is not proved by a mere difference of 
opinion. 
In writing the Halladay decision, this Court defined the 
parameters within which the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
could be used. The Court considered two worthy but sometimes 
conflicting interests: 1) a desire to confirm boundaries that 
have been recognized on the ground over a long period of time, 
and 2) the desire to enhance reliance upon the property dimensions 
shown in county records. The Court concluded that based upon the 
weight the law clearly gives to record title, the availability of 
survey information in platted areas, and the advances in survey 
technology, greater reliance on record title information and 
lesser reliance on boundary by acquiescence should be the govern-
ing standard. 
In general, when survey information is 
reasonably available . . . so that it is 
reasonable to expect the parties to locate 
their boundary on the ground by surveys, the 
court should be less willing to apply the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
Halladay at 504. 
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As set forth above, this Court relegated the status of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence to an exception to the rule, 
that exception being that "only when it is not reasonable to 
expect landowners to ascertain the true location of the boundary 
by [record title information] should landowners be allowed to 
claim boundary by acquiescence. Halladay at 505. 
The burden of proof as to any uncertainty of boundaries, 
which must be met before the elements of boundary by acquiescence 
can be considered, is placed upon the party claiming boundary by 
acquiescence. Halladay at 507. 
In the instant case, there is no uncertainty as to the true 
location of the boundaries between the Judd and the Hutchings 
property. The Cole survey clearly shows the deed description of 
the Judd property and the deed description of the Hutchings 
property. The parties stipulated as to the accuracy of the 
survey. The trial court need have only determined, according to 
the evidence, which deed had priority. The testimony was undis-
puted that the Judd property and corresponding description was 
first, originally from the 183 3 patent, with the Judd property in 
1834. 
As in the Halladay case, "the evidence clearly shows that 
both claimants had ready access to deeds and had actually examined 
surveys clearly establishing the [plaintiffs1] record title to 
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the property in dispute. Consequently, the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence is inapplicable as a matter of law . . . " 
Incidentally, this Court noted that when boundary by acqui-
escence was first introduced in Utah a century ago, Switzaable 
v. Worseldine, 5 Utah 315, 15 P. 144 (1877), much of the state 
had not been surveyed and searches of record title were difficult 
to conduct. Halladay at 504. Here, the property in dispute is 
in a platted area, the parties stipulated as to the accuracy of 
the survey and the only question is which deed line should be 
acknowledged. The fence line should not even have been a choice 
because the Hutchings did not meet their burden of showing an 
"objective uncertainty." 
The Judds submit that even the choice of the Hutchings1 deed 
line would have been more legally sound than to have chosen the 
fence line. 
POINT II 
THE ELEMENTS OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE HAVE 
NOT BEEN MET. 
In Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984), the 
parties acquired adjoining tracts of land from a common grantor 
on the same day in 1904. A fence had existed along a boundary, 
but the plaintiff's predecessor constructed a new fence somewhat 
south of the boundary line. He used the small lane between the 
fences to drive his cattle from a corral that had been construct-
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ed. Some years later, the original fence and corral were torn 
down and later, plaintiff put up another fence. Citing Rinqwood 
v. Bradford, 2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P.2d 1053 (1954), this Court 
stated that: 
The theory under which a boundary line is 
established by long acquiescence along an 
existing fence line is founded on the doctrine 
that the parties erect the fence to settle 
some doubt or uncertainty which they may have 
as to the location of the true boundary, and 
they compromise their differences by agreeing 
to accept the fence line as the limiting line 
of their respective lands. The mere fact 
that a fence happens to be put up and neither 
party does anything about it for a long 
period of time will not establish it as the 
true boundary. 
In the instant case, the fence line was not erected to 
resolve a boundary dispute, and in fact, the fence never for 
certain represented the boundary because, as testified to by 
three separate witnesses, it was moved a number of feet on at 
least three occasions over the years. 
One witness testified that the fence was taken down in 1958, 
in 1977 and in 1978. At one time, an existing ditch was trans-
formed into a cement ditch and this construction caused the fence 
to be moved several feet. (R. 154-6, 172). Further, the fence 
was originally placed a few feet north of where it now stands, 
but it was moved closer to the Judd barn in 1978 because snow 
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continually fell off the roof and knocked the fence over. (R. 
170-171, 193-194). 
A boundary line, to be established by 
acquiescence, must be definite, certain, and 
not speculative. Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 
2d 282, 421 P.2d 944 (1966). 
Furthermore, one witness testified that during the time that 
the fence was being repaired and moved, he had spoken to a prior 
owner of the Hutchings property, a Mr. Liechty, who stated that it 
did not really matter too much where the fence was located because 
the fence was not on the correct deed line and would need to be 
moved further onto the Hutchings property. 
Although the trial court should not even have reached the 
question of boundary by acquiescence because the Hutchings did 
not meet their burden of proof as to uncertainty, it is clear that 
the existing fence line should not have been utilized for boundary 
by acquiescence since it has been moved several times and was 
never intended to be the boundary line. 
Further, since the fence line has been altered by more than 
a few feet as recently as 1977 and again in 1978, the boundary 
line does not meet the element of "a long period of time" which 
has been defined as at least 20 years. Halladay at 503, Parsons 
v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah 1984). 
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POINT III 
TESTIMONY AS TO A PRIOR CONVERSATION WITH THE 
HUTCHINGS1 PREDECESSOR WAS ADMISSIBLE 
AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE. 
The Judds presented evidence through testimony of a member 
of the Judd family who stated that while the fence was being 
repaired and moved, he had spoken with a Mr. Liechty, a prior 
owner of the Hutchings property. Mr. Liechty stated that it did 
not really matter too much where the fence was located because 
the fence was not on the correct deed line and would need to be 
moved further onto the Hutchings property. At trial, the defen-
dants, the Hutchings, objected to this proffer on the grounds of 
hearsay. The Judds submit that this evidence is admissible as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
In the case of Roach v. Dahl, 35 P.2d 993 (Utah 1934), the 
issue revolved around a proper location of a section cornerstone. 
After examining the facts, the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
"hearsay evidence is admissible in a case of this kind to prove 
the location of a corner or boundary line.11 The Court did not 
supply its own reasoning for this rule but did cite the Washing-
ton case of Inmon v. Pearson, 92 P. 279 (Wash. 1907). 
In the Inmon case, the Court, in discussing the reasoning 
behind the exception to the hearsay rule, stated: 
In the United States hearsay evidence is 
admissible both upon questions of boundary 
11 
affecting public rights and also in the case 
of disputes as to boundaries between private 
landowners. 
This rule is also set forth by Greenleaf on Evidence, Section 
170. Further, in Boardman v. Lessees of Reed, 6 Pet. (U.S.) 328, 
8 L.Ed. 415, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking 
through Mr. Justice McClean, said that: 
Boundaries may be proved by hearsay testimony 
is rule well settled and a necessity of 
propriety of which is not now questioned. 
Some difference of opinion may exist as to 
the application of this rule, but there can 
be none as to its legal force. 
See also, Jones on Evidence, Section 9.1, Declarations as to 
Private Boundaries, and Wiamore on Evidence, 3d Ed. Section 1563. 
The testimony in question is pertinent to establish that the 
fence line was never relied upon in mutual acquiescence. 
POINT IV 
PRIORITY OF TITLE IS FOUND IN THE 
JUDD TITLE. 
As set forth above, because the only issue properly before 
the trial court was to determine which of the two deed lines was 
correct based upon priority of title, it is necessary to address 
the Hutchings1 claims of merger of title. 
Undisputed testimony at trial, that of Glen Christensen, of 
Provo Land Title Company, revealed that the Judd property was 
deeded out of a U.S. land patent in 183 3 and that the Hutchings1 
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property was so deeded in 1884. (R. 135-7). His testimony was 
based upon computer plotted maps from the Utah County Plat 
Department and based upon record titles. (R. 138). The overlap 
in descriptions was created at the time of the patent and has 
existed since the patent. 
He further testified that a Mr. Willis Strong was once the 
owner of both parcels of ground. He deeded out both parcels of 
ground using the same legal description that came from the 
patent. He deeded out the Hutchings1 property prior to deeding 
out the plaintiffs1 property; however, it is the position of the 
plaintiffs that this was immaterial in that there was not a 
merger of title in view of the fact that the same legal descrip-
tion came in as went out and that the same conflict in descrip-
tions existed. 
Further, it is axiomatic that in property disputes, that 
where there exists a clash of boundaries in two deeds from the 
same grantor (in this instance, the 183 3 and 1834 grants from the 
United States patent), the title to the first deed executed is 
superior. Groenwald v. Camano Bluepoint Oyster Co., 81 P. 2d 826 
(Wash. 1938) . 
CONCLUSION 
The only question properly before the trial court was to 
determine which deed line title should have been quieted. The 
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Judds submit that even title quieted in the Hutchings1 deed line 
would have been preferable to title quieted in a fence line which 
has been moved over the years and which was never intended to be 
a property boundary. 
Based upon the 1833 patent, appellants respectfully seek a 
reversal with title quieted based upon the Judd description. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ift^av of June, 1986. 
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DATED this (P,^ "-" day of June, 1986. 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fore-
going was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 
day of June, 198 6, 
Mr. Michael J. Petro 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Explin 
Attorneys for Respondents 
43 East 200 North 
Post Office Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603 
DON R. PETERSEN 
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ADDENDUM 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLAIR W. and GLADYS JUDD FAMILY 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BERNELL L. HUTCHINGS, MRS. 
BERNELL HUTCHINGS, RONALD J. 
SHERMAN and MRS. RONALD J. 
SHERMAN, 
Defendants. 
COME NOW the parties of the above-entitled action and stipulate through 
their attorneys of record that in order to simplify the trial of this case, that 
the following facts are admitted as being true and accurate. 
1. Donald C. Cole is a licensed, registered land surveyor who has 
surveyed the properties of the plaintiff and the defendant. 
2. Set forth on Exhibit "A", which Exhibit is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference is a photostatic copy of part of Donald C. Cole 
Survey. 
3. That in respect to the dispute over the property on the west side of 
the defendant's property, which is marked from Point WA" to Point "G" in blue, 
5 SEP - 6 PM *: Qk 
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STIPULATION 
Case No. 69,183 
there is no dispute as to the proper boundary and title to the property can and 
shall be quieted in the name of the plaintiff on the deed line which deed line is 
marked in blue. That the defendants' claim no right, title, or interest beyond 
the deed line designated in blue Point "A" to Point "GM. The plaintiffs may move 
the fence that now exists from its present location to the deed line description 
designated in blue from Point "A" to Point "G". 
4. That the issues to be tried by the Court involve the property 
designated as a southern portion of the defendants' property and the northern 
portion of the plaintiffs' property. There are set forth certain colored markings 
which are indicated as follows: 
a. Point "A" to Point "B" in black is the present fence line. 
b. Point "C" to Point "DH designated in red, is the 
Hutchings' deed line. 
c. Point "E" to Point "F", in yellow, is the Judd deed line. 
5. The issue before the Court and to be resolved by the Court is the 
question, what is the proper boundary between the plaintiffs' and the defendants' 
property, that is, should it be at the present fence line designated in black, 
Point "A" to Point "B", should it be the Hutchings' deed line, designated as Point 
"C" to Point "Dw in red, or whether it should be the Judd deed line, designated in 
yellow, from Point "E" to Point "F". 
6. A further issue to be resolved by the Court is in the event the Court 
determines that the correct boundary line is not at the current fence line, who 
pays for the expenses of moving the fence to its correct location? 
2 
7. The last issue to be determined by the Court is what, if any, 
damages have the plaintiff's suffered in respect to the disputed boundary line? 
DATED this *£_ day of A*£«t, 1985. 
DATED th is ^ day of 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
st, 1985. 
MICHAEL J^PEf-Rt), for 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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